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COMMENTS
WILLS - DEVISE OR BEQUEST ON CONDITION THAT DEVISEE 1 PAY
DEBTS OR LEGACIES - It is not an uncommon practice for a testator
to make a gift on the condition that the devisee pay to other legatees
certain sums specified by the will. For example, testator devises Blackacre to A on the condition that A pay to B $500. Simple as the plan
may seem at first glance, it has given rise to several complex questions
regarding the legal relationship between A and B. Is A personally
1 As used in this comment, the term "devisee" includes both the recipient of a
bequest and the recipient of a devise.
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liable to B? If there is a personal liability, is A obligated to pay $500
even though Blackacre may have so depreciated in value that at the
time of testator's death it is worth only $300? Upon what theory can
such liability be imposed?
Many decisions and textwriters hold that A is personally liable to
B if A accepts the gift. 2 The views expressed in these decisions clearly
indicate that the personal liabilitJ4 of A extends even to any deficiency
between the value of the devise and the amount of the obligation. The
reasoning upon which this conclusion is reached fails to evince any
great degree of clarity, the opinions merely seeming to express the
feeling that there ought to be such a liability, and therefore, the court
will impose one, Since the use of the conditional gift device by testators
is quite common, it should merit a scrutiny of the cases involving the
problem.
I.

The doctrine imposing a personal liability on the devisee when
there is a charge on the gift has a unique history. It might be said that
the doctrine originated and received its greatest development in dicta,
first appearing about r595 in Collier's Case.3 Testator in that case made
a devise to A, with the proviso that A pay a certain sum to third parties.
Because the sum to be paid by A was too large to be paid out of the
income from the devised land, A was declared to hold a fee rather than
a life estate even though the technical words required at that time to
create a fee were not used. The court feared that if A were deemed
to hold only a life estate, he would suffer a loss because he might die
before he received an amount from the land sufficient to satisfy the
charge. Therefore, the court decided that A had a fee, saying, "for the
law doth intend that the devise was for his benefit, and not for his
2
Hamilton v. Porter, 63 Pa. 332 (1869); Williams v. Nichol, 47 Ark. 254,
S. W. 243 (1886); Olmstead v. Brush, 27 Conn. 530 (1858); Porter v. Jackson,
95 Ind. 210 (1883); Millington v. Hill, 47 Ark. 301, 1 S. W. 547 (1886); Bishop
v. Howarth, 59 Conn. 455, 22 A. 432 (1890); Huhlein v. Huhlein, 87 Ky. 247,
8 S. W. 260 (1888); Stringer v. Gamble, 155 Mich. 295, u8 N. W. 979 (1909);
Hoffman v. Friend, 92 N. J. Eq. 60, III A. 654 (1920), affd. 92 N. J. Eq. 452,
II2 A. 498 (1921); Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136 (1879) ;. Fuller v. McEwen,
17 Ohio St. 288 (1867); Case v. Hall, 52 Ohio St. 24, 38 N. E. 618 (1894);
Dixon v. Helena Society, 65 Okla. 203, 166 P. II4 (1917); Sauer v. Mellinger, 138
Pa. 338, 22 A. 89 (1890); Shired v. Nesbit, 90 S. C. 20, 72 S. E. 545 (1911);
Wenner v. George, 129 Va. 615, 106 S. E. 365· (1921); Steele v. Korn, 137 Wis.
51, u8 N. W. 207, 120 N. W. 261 (1908); Bird v. Hawkins, 58 N. J. Eq. 299,
42 A. 588 (1899); Glen v. Fisher, 6 Johns Ch. 33 (1822); Gridley v. Gridley,
24 N. Y. 130 (1861); Preston v. Preston, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1040 (1857); In re
Skingley, 3 Mac. & G. 221, 42 Eng. Rep. 246 (1851). See also 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 370 (1936); and I PAGE, CoNTRACTs, 2d ed., § 148 (1920).
3
6 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 276 (1595).
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prejudice." 4 This early case indicates that the court was so certain there
was a personal liability on the part of A to pay the charge that the
issue was not even discussed. On the other hand, it would seem to be
extremely difficult under the holding of Collier's Case to impose a
deficiency liability on the devisee where there was an inadequate gift,
because the court expressly declared that in case of a devise "the law
doth intend" a benefit and not a prejµdice.
In the case of Ewer v. Jones,5 which was decided in 1703, Lord
Holt stated in a dictum, which was frequently referred to by later
English cases, that there was a clear liability on the devisee, and that
the charge on the land could be recovered by an action of debt. 6
In 1827 the case of Henvell v. Whitaker 1 indicated that the English Court of Chancery was ready to abandon the theory that there
was a personal liability on the donee. The court expressed the feeling
that in such a case there was a charge on the property received, but no
personal liability. The words of the court were:
"· .. In such case the obligation to pay his debts and funeral expenses would be a condition imposed upon the nephew William
Whitaker, to be satisfied as far as all the property, which he derived under the will, would extend, whether personal or real.
This principle will reconcile all the authorities, and will be of
ready application in future cases." 8
The closing sentence of Henvell v. Whitaker proved to be much
more optimistic than accurate. As a matter of fact, in the very next year
the personal liability of the devisee seems to have been quite firmly
established by Messenger v. Andrews.9 That case is significant because
it seems to be the only one on record in which a deficiency liability was
actually enforced against a devisee, although there are many supporting
dicta. In the case testator bequeathed a public-house to A on condition
that A pay certain legacies and all testator's debts. The property was
worth only£ 500, but the debts amounted to£ 2500. A proved the will
and continued the business. Five years later A filed a bill to raise the
excess of the debts over the bequest from di:fferent freeholds devised by
testator. It was held that the testator made the payment of his debts
"the price at which his son [A] was to purchase the public-house and
4!d.
5
2 Salk. 415, 91 Eng. Rep. 360, 2 Ld. Ray. 934, 92 Eng. Rep. 124, Holt 419,
90 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1703).
6
Lord Holt's dictum is appended to a case involving a dispute over a seaman's
wages. It appears to be a statement made by Lord Holt in some other case, but which
was inadvertently tacked onto Ewer v. Jones. In connection with the dictum, see
Braithwaite v. Skinner, 5 M. & W. 313, 151 Eng. Rep. 133 (1839).
7
3 Russ. 343, 38 Eng. Rep. 605 (1827).
8
ld.
9
4 Russ. 478, 38 Eng. Rep. 885 (1828).
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goodwill." It should be noted, however, that this decision was not a
final one in the case because there had to be a further hearing as to
whether A had accepted the bequest. But it does seem to evidence a
clear holding that if A did accept, there would be a personal liability
on A to pay the legacies and debts even though they amounted to several times the value of the gift.
Though the decisions of the American courts are not uniform, there
is widespread authority to support the statement that the American
courts to a large extent have adopted the result reached in Messenger
10
'V. Andrews.
Unfortunately the theory upon which this result is
reached is still almost as obscure as it was in 1595 when Collier's Case
first held, without even discussing the issue, that there was a personal
liability on the devisee. The doctrine would appear to be a legal
anomaly.
2.

Merely stating that there is a doctrine imposing liability on the
devisee and calling that doctrine anomalous is not much help to counsel who is faced with some specific feature of the problem. The important questions seem to be: (I) Is there a sound basis for the doctrine
that a devisee is liable for the charges on his gift? (2) What is the
extent of the liability?
Although few courts have indulged in extensive analysis of the
problem, they have all, with the exception of the court in Collier's
Case, tended to set forth some sort of reason for their conclusion. In
his dictum in Ewer v. Jones, Lord Holt advanced the unusual idea that
the Statute of Wills imposed the liability upon the devisee. Other
courts have presented the theory that the intention of the testator
served as the basis for the rule. In Bishop v. Howarth 11 the court states:
"It must be conceded at the outset that a personal obligation
to pay the debts is not in terms imposed on the defendants, but
the scheme of the testator and the entire will, taken in connection
with the circumstances, furnish ground for a strong implication
that such was the intention of the testator."
In the decision of Porter v. Jackson 12 is found the sentence: "It seems
to be plain that the testator intended to impose a personal charge upon
the devisees." 111 There are some cases where this testamentary intent
10

See cases cited in note

2,

supra. See contra: Livingston v. Livingston, 3 Johns

(N. Y.) 189 (1808).
11
59 Conn. 455 at 464, 22 A. 432 (1890).
12
95 Ind. 210 at 214 (1883).
18 Porter v. Jackson also relies on the contract theory. But for other cases on the
testamentary intent theory, see Wenner v. George, 129 Va. 615, 106 S. E. 365
(1921); Hoffman v. Friend, 92 N. J. Eq. 60, I I I A. 654 (1920), affd. 92 N. J.
Eq. 452, 112 A. 498 (1921).
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theory might apply, but it is submitted that in the majority of the cases
which would be contested the theory would be of no value at all.
Those cases which are likely to be brought before the courts are the
ones in which the gift of the testator has substantially depreciated in
value so that at the time the gift takes effect there is little or nothing
left for the donee but the burdensome personal liability for any deficiency. Normally in a case like that it could not reasonably be contended that the testator intended to impose a personal liability on the
devisee.14 In fact, under the testamentary intention theory it would
seem exceedingly difficult ever to impose deficiency liability on the
devisee.
A large majority of the courts support the personal liability doctrine on the contract theory. The difficulty with too many of them is
that they merely state there is a contractual liability with no further
elucidation. Unfortunately the problem is not susceptible to so simple
a solution. In the first place, what kind of a contract is it? Who are the
parties? Where is the mutual assent? These are the questions that arise
when the contractual analysis is applied to the conditional gift made by
a testator.
Clearly the contract is not express. It cannot be said that the devisee accepts a valid offer of th·e testator because at the time the offer
( or bequest) is accepted the testator is dead. It is well established that
death of the offeror terminates an offer.15 However, the courts that
follow the contract theory are prone to speak of "implied obligation"
and "implied promise." In Brown v. Knapp,1 6 the court said:
"The payment of such a legacy can be enforced by a suit in
equity against the real estate, or by a common law action directly
against the devisee upon the implied promise to pay it-a promise
implied by his acceptance of the devise."
In Case v. Hall 11 appears:
" ..• So that where a devisee is required to pay legacies to others,
an acceptance of the devise imports a promise to pay the legacies;
14
ln Martens v. Sachs, 138 Neb. 678, 294 N. W. 426 (1940), the testator
devised to his son E So acres of land on condition that E pay to his brothers and
sisters $7,500. At the time the will was executed the land was worth $250 per acre.
At time of testator's death it was worth only about $80 per acre. E wisely renounced,
and the court held that $7,500 was a charge on the land which could not be extinguished
by E's rejection. But the point is that it hardly seems that the testator, who had
planned a gift of $12,500 to E and $7,500 to the rest of the children, would intend
that E, his favorite son, should be forced to pay the deficiency. Under the testamentary
intent theory that is the result one would reach.
10
I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 62 (1936).
16
79 N. Y. 136 at 143 (1879).
17
52 Ohio St. 24 at 32, 38 N. E. 618 (1894).
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and the legatees have the right to maintain an action thereon for
its non-performance, as though the promise had been made to
themselves." 18
The decisions themselves do not indicate definitely whether the
court is talking of a contract implied in law or one implied in fact. Because so many of the courts that follow the contract theory also impose,
at least in dictum, a deficiency liability, it appears that most cases concern a contract implied in fact. This conclusion is reached because under
a quasi-contract, or contract-implied-in-law, theory there probably
would be no deficiency liability on the devisee. Since, speaking in a
broad sense, quasi contracts are imposed by law for the purpose of
bringing about justice,1° it would seem that the law would be defeating
its purpose if it required the devisee to dig into his own assets to pay
the legacy to the party named in the will. Imposing a quasi contract
on the donee to establish a deficiency liability would be too much like
"robbing Peter to pay Paul." However, it is conceivable that in a case
where the amount left by the testator was sufficient to meet the obligation at the testator's death and subsequently became insufficient at the
time the obligation was to be paid or at the time of suit for payment, a
court might well impose a deficiency liability on the devisee.
If the obligation of the devisee is called a contract implied in fact,
then a result consistent with that which the courts indicate by their
dicta will be reached, namely, personal liability on the devisee even to
the extent of any deficiency. Because once it is established that there
is a contract implied in fact, then the effect is to say that the devisee
promised to pay the legacy, and the matter of inadequacy of the gift
is simply a risk which the devisee takes, similar to that involved in any
express contract.
If for the purposes of analysis the contract-implied-in-fact philosophy will be accepted, there is still a question which none of the courts
seems to have considered. To whom is the promise made? To the
testator? To the legatee or creditor?
It seems clear that the promise in such a case must be impliedly
made to the legatee. It could not be made to the testator because at the
time of the making of the implied promise ( the date of acceptance of
the gift) the testator is dead. On the other hand, it would not be satisfactory to say the promise was made to the executor for the estate,
because in many of the cases the devisee himself is the executor. The
more accurate analysis would seem to require the conclusion that the
18

See also Olmstead v. Brush, 27 Conn. 530 (1858); Hill v. Huston's Executor,
56 Va. 350 (1859); In re McMahon, [1901] l Ir. R. 489; Gridley v. Gridley, 24
N. Y. 130 (1861).
19
1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 3 (1936).
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implied promise is made to the legatee with the consideration moving
from a third party-the testator. 20
Obviously the most significant question under the extent of the
devisee's liability is the problem whether or not he is liable for the
deficiency where the gift is inadequate to cover the requested payment.
As before stated, the nearest any court comes to squarely meeting the
problem is in the case of Messenger 'V. Andrews,21 which indicated that
if the devisee accepted the public-house as devisee and not as executor,
then he would be personally liable for £ 2500 of debts, even though
the public-house was worth only £ 500.
One American case comes almost as close to deciding the problem directly. In Hill 'V. Huston's Executor 22 the will states: "I give
and bequeath to my beloved wife, Jane Pollock, my whole and entire
estate of every description; but for and in consideration whereof, she is
to pay all my just debts." The value of the estate was $913, and the
debts amounted to $1291. The court held that there was no doubt that
a party might bind himself to the performance of a condition, although
the burden might exceed the benefit, by accepting a gift coupled with a
condition. But the court held that to constitute a binding acceptance the
devisee had to know all the relevant facts and circumstances. Because
the widow had accepted the gift without knowing the circumstances
she was "relieved" of her liability. This case seems to illustrate the
solicitous attitude the courts will probably take where the possibility
of a deficiency liability arises, even though the dicta threaten the devisee with severe liability. 23

3.
In the conditional gift situation two main principles seem to run
through every consideration of the problem. On the one hand there is
a feeling that if the devisee accepts the gift, he should pay the legacies.
On the other hand, to require him to pay the legacies even though the
gift is inadequate to meet them not only seems extremely unfair, but
does not appear to carry out the intention of the testator. In other
words, looking at the problem from a purely nontechnical viewpoint
20 This question must seem somewhat embarrassing to the English courts, which
refuse to enforce third-party beneficiary contracts in which the consideration moves
from anyone but the promisee. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915]
A. C. 847; Thomas v. Thomas, 2' Q. B. 851, II4 Eng. Rep. 330 (1842); McLean
v. McDougall, l Maritime Prov. Rep. (Can.) 77 (1929).
21 4 Russ. 478, 38 Eng. Rep. 885 (1828), discussed supra at note 9.
22
56 Va. 350 (1859).
28 Some courts impose an equitable charge or lien on the gift as security for the
payment of the legacy. Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136 (1879); Rees v. Engeback,
L. R. 12 Eq. 225 (1871); In re McMahon, [1901] l Ir. R. 489; Olmstead v. Brush,
27 Conn. 530 (1858); Gridley v. Gridley, 24 N. Y. 130 (1861).
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it seems that the devisee should be required to pay the legacies, but
should not be liable for any deficiency. Probably it is very easy to
overemphasize the deficiency problem. The lack of cases on the point
is a good indication of that. Certainly most people would avoid any
deficiency liability by merely refusing to accept the gift. But, as indicated by scattered cases, the problem does arise on occasion.
Looking at the problem from the strictly legal point of view, the
courts have ceased their analysis too soon. They find a contractual
liability but refrain from carrying the analogy further. The contractimplied-in-fact theory is a satisfactory one, although it does seem impossible to reconcile that theory with the English doctrine against
third-party beneficiary contracts and contracts where the consideration
is moving from a person other than the promisee. On the other hand,
the quasi-contractual theory could have been used to explain the actual
decisions in nearly all the American cases; and it has the advantage of
avoiding the possibility of a deficiency liability in most situations.
Stark Ritchie

